CVE-2026-43495
⚠️ highSummary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes. Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the po
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler
t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as
a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer
contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte
buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.
Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header
fields to guard against undersized messages.
Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.
In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a
remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len
against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed
integer overflow on offset.
Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after
skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.
📊 Relative Risk Intelligence
This CVE is High Risk - more severe than 80.8% of all 365,620 vulnerabilities in our database.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H